This Ken Adelman column at Tech Central Station reminds me of something a Korean classmate at the US Army Command and General Staff College said to me. A Korean Army Lieutenant Colonel and a former aide to the Minister of Defense, he asked me if I knew why the US had troops stationed in South Korea. To keep the North Korean from over-running you I answered. "No, to keep the South from going north. As soon as you leave, we will conquer the north and then attack Japan." LTC X's mentors are now out of power but he was deadly serious at the time. He went on to explain how powerful SK was compared to NK using a national power model that included GNP, military power, population, and social structure. Fifteen years ago, his argument was very convincing and the South has only progressed relative to the North in the intervening years.

Maybe we really should leave and let the countries in the region solve the problem of a fruitcake with nuclear weapons. Afterall, it will take NK a few more years to achieve ICBM capabilities and they are not otherwise a threat to the US.

Next week, as a start to a discussion of evolving military technology, I intend to post on High Energy Lasers. Back in November Donald Sensing ran a series of post on lasers. Scroll down and read all the posts if you are interested in this subject. I ran the experiments he discusses and have continued to track laser technology advances since my retirement. I have a slightly different opinion on lasers than Rev. Sensing, but agree with him in general.

The January 2003 issue of “Army”, the magazine of the Association of the US Army has an article by retired Lieutenant Colonel Robert Leonhard “Factors of Conflict in the Early 21st Century”. here Scroll down to the article. His premise is that we are entering an age when large formations are becoming obsolete and small highly mobile, joint forces enhanced by “technology” are the forces of choice now and in the future. An excerpt:

One of the most dramatic changes in warfare that has unfolded over the past few decades is the move toward formationless warfare. One could argue that until recently, military art and science has aimed at building, training and using tactical formations as the primary expression of ground combat power. From the phalanx to the legion, from the tercio to l'ordre mixte, from the panzer division to fronts in echelon, conventional warfare has featured coherent formations, each trying to break the other.

Early 21st-century warfare is witnessing the death of the formation, and this revolutionary demise is the product of two factors. First, Western military forces (and Americans in particular) have demonstrated the ability to destroy virtually any formation through overwhelming joint fires. Given the right circumstances, it is almost inconceivable that a modern armored formation could attack and maintain momentum against a robust U.S. joint force. Our ability to sense and destroy targets both with long-range fires (air, artillery) and in close battle render enemy armored formations as useless as a cavalry charge. Ground formations, once so powerful and coherent, now represent convenient targets, especially when they move.

Assuming that LTC Leonhard is right in his premise, how will it affect how the US organizes, trains and equips its forces? Is technology capable of delivering the weapons, sensors and communications required to make the forces possible? What are those forces? One possibility is a small ground force that looks much like current Army Special Operations and the Marines backed by greatly enhanced firepower delivered by long-range artillery and airborne platforms. I see a future Army of 200,000 or fewer active duty soldiers all of whom are what we think of today as Special Operations and artillery and air platforms capable of delivering precise devastating fires where the ground forces direct. In the early 1990s, an Air Force officer published an article in the Air War College journal with the premise that the USAF was the only "Cold War" branch of the US military and if it did not find a mission relevant in the post-Cold War world, it would cease to exist. The AF adjusted. The US military has a critical world role to play today and in the future. The question is can it overcome entrenched ways of thinking and meet the challenges. Is "Transformation" really accomplished by buying smaller tanks and more expensive air platforms or are more fundamental changes necessary.

I have more questions than answers, so if you have any ideas let me know.